


SAFETY AND SECURITY SECTORAL BARGAINING COUCIL



SSSBC



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FAX COVER SHEET

PSSS344-19/20

DATE: 25 January 2021

TO: SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE SERVICE
C/o Brigadier P de Kock
Email: dekockpfp@saps.gov.za

Respondent


TO: PSA OBO MKHUZANGWE AND 48 OTHERS
Email: ARCHIE.SIGUDLA@psa.co.za

Applicant

MESSAGE:

Please find the attached award from Panellist P Phundu for the case number **PSSS344-19/20**.

Kind regards,


Khomotso Mosoane
Secretary, SSSBC

IF ANY PART OF THIS FASCIMILE IS NOT CLEAR PLEASE CONTACT THE ABOVE NUMBER



**SAFETY & SECURITY SECTORAL
BARGAINING COUNCIL**

SSSBC



ARBITRATION AWARD

Commissioner: Paul Phundu

Case No: PSSS344-19/20

Date of Hearing: 4 November 2020

Date of Award: 21 January 2021

In the ARBITRATION between:

PSA obo Mkhuzangwe and 48 Others

(Applicant)

And

South African Police Services

(Respondent)

Applicants representative: Mr A Sigudla

Applicants address:

PO Box 40404

Arcadia 0007

Email address: archie.sigudla@psa.co.za

Respondent : Mr M Lekala

Respondent's address:

Private Bag x 94

Pretoria 0001

Email address: deKockPFP@saps.gov.za

DETAILS OF HEARING AND REPRESENTATION

- [1] This is the award in the arbitration between PSA obo Mkhuzangwe N, & 48 Others (hereinafter referred to as the Applicants) and the South African Police Services, (hereinafter referred to as the Respondent). The matter was set down for arbitration hearing on 4 November 2020, at SAPS Legal Services, 2nd Floor Conference Room, Presidia Building, Pretoria.
- [2] The applicants were present and represented by, Mr Archie Sigudla, Union Official from PSA. The respondent was represented by, Mr Makgale Lekala, its Employee Relations Official.
- [3] The arbitration hearing was held under the auspices of the Council in terms of section 191(5) (a) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, as amended (the Act). The award is issued in terms of section 138 (7) of the Act.
- [4] Bundle of documents marked annexure "A" and "B" were admitted into evidence and the content was not disputed.
- [5] The proceedings were digitally recorded. I have also kept handwritten notes.
- [6] Both parties agreed to argue in writing the allegation of unfair labour practice concerning fairness or unfairness in relation to pay progression.

ISSUE TO BE DECIDED

- [7] I am required to establish whether the respondent committed an unfair labour practice in relation to benefits or not, if so, I must determine the appropriate remedy.

PRELIMINARY POINT

Respondent's submission

Representation

- [8] The applicants are represented by Public Servants Association of South Africa ("PSA") a trade union which is not party to the Safety and Security Sectoral Bargaining Council, Agreement No: 2/2008 which was concluded by The South African Police Service, Police and Prison Civil Rights Union ("POPCRU") and South African Police Union ("SAPU") at CENTURION on the 01 April 2008, see annexure ("A").
- [9] We therefore object the representation of the applicants by "PSA" since the union is not the party to the Safety and Security Sectoral Bargaining Council Agreement No. 2 of 2008 and its member or representative cannot therefore bring an application on behalf of the applicants to the Council, he does not have "locus standi".

Jurisdiction

- [10] Pay progression is equivalent to remunerations and therefore become part of salary disputes which in terms of the referral form are excluded and cannot correctly be referred as unfair labour practice relating to benefits, See Annexure ("B")
- [11] Safety and Security Sectoral Bargaining Council, Agreement No. 3 of 2009 regulates remunerative allowances and benefits which among others include, service bonus, separation allowance, clothing for work, assistance with boarding school and lodging fees, sessional assistance, travel, allowance for secretaries to heads of departments, caretaker's allowance (police flats), cryptographic allowance, recognition of long service, night shift allowance, resettlement, transport between residence and work, accommodation while on official journeys and state and other housing.

[12] Pay progression is not included in the agreement and therefore cannot be regarded as benefit. We submit that the dispute has been wrongly referred as unfair labour practice under the benefit and the Safety and Security Sectoral Bargaining Council (SSSBC) does not have jurisdiction to hear the matter.

Applicants submission

[13] The Respondent raised two (2) point in-limine with regards to the claim raised by the applicant (Public Servants Association) on behalf of its members, namely the representation and jurisdiction by council to adjudicate on pay progression claim.

[14] The Safety and Security Sectoral Bargaining Council Constitution, Agreement No.1 of 2008, Clause 4.11. Provides, in any conciliation/ arbitration/ joint conciliation and arbitration proceedings, a party to the dispute may appear in person or be represented only by, in the case of an employee or trade unions.

4.11. (a) a legal practitioner;

(b) a co-employee from the same unit/station/component with same geographical area as the applicant, provided that such co-employee will not be regarded as being on duty and any costs incurred by the co-employee will not be borne by the employer; or

(c) a shop-steward, office bearer, official or a legal representative employed / contracted by the party's trade union recognized in the sector, and such shop steward shall be regarded to be on duty provided that the person must have been a member in good standing of such trade union at the time of that cause of action which had led to the dispute arose; or

(d) an office bearer or official of that party's trade union recognized in that public service provided that the person must have been a member in good standing of such trade union at the time that the cause of action which had led to the dispute arose.

[15] The Respondent in the submission contends that the applicant herein cannot be able to bring this application on behalf of its member by virtue of not being a signatory to the SSSBC Agreement No.2, therefore does not have the locus standi.

The applicants wish to submit that the fact that the Public Servants Association (PSA) was not a signatory to the SSSBC Agreement No. 2 would not preclude it from exercising its rights, as that would be offending fundamental right given to workers or employees, which is the employees' right to freedom of association as conferred by the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa.

[16] We further wish to submit that its settled law that the Constitutional Court in the case of *POPCRU v SACOSWU and Others* (CCT152/17[2018] ZACC 24; [2018] 11 BLLR 1035 (CC); 2018 (11) BCLR 1411 (CC) ; 2018 39 ILJ 2646 (CC) 2019 (1) SA 73 (CC) delivered on 23 August 2018, wherein it enunciated that the existence of the collective agreement does not prohibits the minority unions from exercising the rights conferred in terms of section 14 (4) of the Labour Relations Act, as the trade union sourced its rights to represent employees in grievance and disciplinary proceedings. And importantly to be noted that such right does not fall within the scope of section 18 collective agreement.

[17] There was dissenting judgments with regards to this POPCRU matter, however the Deputy Chief Justice also agreed that the appeal should be dismissed. However, his reasons differed from those given in the second judgement. Zondo DCJ took the view that in our law organisational rights can be acquired contractually or statutorily. He said that the LRA makes provision for statutory organisational rights and section 20 of the LRA constituted an acknowledgement that a trade union may acquire contractual organisational rights by concluding a collective agreement with an employer. Zondo DCJ pointed out that to acquire statutory organisational rights a trade union does not need the consent of the employer but simply needs to meet the requirements of the LRA that it must be sufficiently representative of the employees of the employer in a particular workplace whereas, to acquire contractual organisational rights, a trade union does not need to meet the levels of representativeness prescribed by the LRA but needs to reach an agreement with the employer in terms of which the employer confers those organisational rights on the union.

[18] Article 3 of the ILO Workers' Representatives Convention No 135 of 1971 defines workers' representatives as follows: "For the purpose of this Convention the term workers' representatives means persons who are recognised as such under national law or practice, whether they are – (a) trade union representatives, namely, representatives designated or elected by trade unions or by members of such trade unions; or (b) elected representatives, namely, representatives who are freely elected by the workers of the undertaking in accordance with provisions of national laws or regulations or of collective

agreements and whose functions do not include activities which are recognised as the exclusive prerogative of trade unions in the country concerned."

[19] We therefore submit that the averment made by the respondent herein is flawed and irrational as result it should be dismissed by the arbitrator in this regard, because the PSA as a trade union has got an obligation to service its members and should it fails in that regard it would not escape that responsibility with impunity, that was also echoed by the Constitutional Court, in the matter Food and Allied Workers Union v Ngcobo NO and Another (CCT 50/13) [2013] ZACC 36; 2013 (12) BCLR 1343 (CC)

[20] We therefore respectfully submit that even if the PSA is not signatory to the SSSBC Agreement no 2 of 2008, PSA has locus standing to represent its members within the SSSBC and also empowered by the SSSBC Constitution clause 4.11 referred to above. And further the argument that perhaps the respondent may wish to think of raising that those members may not have been members in good standing when the dispute arose cannot be sustained because it's settled law that in the case of MacDonald Transport Upington (Pty) Ltd v Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union (AMCU) and Others (JA10/2016) [2016] ZALAC 32; 2016) 37 (ILJ) 2593 (LAC); [2017] 2 BLLR 105 (LAC) (28 June 2016), wherein the court said, "Bluntly, what business is it of an employer, in such circumstance, to concern itself with whether membership dues are up to date or any other aspect of the relationship between individual employees and their union?"

[21] The second point raised by the respondent, is that the dispute that is before the council, namely unfair labour practice-benefits. Wherein the applicants have not been paid their pay progression by the respondent is regulated by the SSSBC Agreement no. 3 of 2009, the respondent herein went further and elaborates what the said agreement provides for. We respectfully submit that the claim that is currently before the arbitrator relates to unfair labour practice in terms of section 186 (2)(a) provision of benefits and the matter is properly before council, as the insinuation that this dispute was brought in terms of interpretation/ application of SSSBC Agreement no 3 of 2009 is not our dispute. There's a plethora of court cases that dealt with the interpretation to be accorded to the term "benefits" in section 186(2)(a) of the Labour Relations Act as amended, the leading case being the Labour Appeal Court case of Apollo Tyres South Africa (Pty) Ltd v CCMA (DA1/11) [2013] ZALAC.

[22] We therefore submit that this matter is properly before the council and as result the argument raised to the effect that council lacks jurisdiction is flawed and incorrect as such it should be dismissed by the arbitrator.

[23] We respectfully submit to the commissioner that this matter is properly before the council and we have made up our case in terms of the deposed statement of case already alluded to and we therefore urge the commissioner to consider the matter as empowered in terms of the act.

FINDING

[24] The Safety and Security Sectoral Bargaining Council Constitution, Agreement No.1 of 2008, Clause 4.11. Provides, *in any conciliation/ arbitration/ joint conciliation and arbitration proceedings, a party to the dispute may appear in person or be represented only by, in the case of an employee or trade unions. Clause 4.11 of the Constitution:*

(c) a shop-steward, office bearer, official or a legal representative employed / contracted by the party's trade union recognized in the sector, and such shop steward shall be regarded to be on duty provided that the person must have been a member in good standing of such trade union at the time of that cause of action which had led to the dispute arose; or

(d) an office bearer or official of that party's trade union recognized in the public service provided that the person must have been a member in good standing of such trade union at the time that the cause of action which had led to the dispute arose.

[25] It is my finding that PSA is a union recognized in the Public Service Sector. Clause 4.11 of Agreement No. 1 of 2008 (Council's Constitution) allows and empowers the union to represent its members in the Safety and Security Sectoral Bargaining Council. The Public Servants Association has locus standi to represent its members in the Bargaining Council.

[26] I agree with the applicants that the claim that is currently before the arbitrator relates to unfair labour practice in terms of section 186 (2)(a) provision of benefits and the matter is properly before council, this dispute was not brought in terms of interpretation/ application of SSSBC Agreement no 3 of 2009. In my view, disputes relating to unfair labour practice benefits and/or pay progression are not amongst the disputes that the Council lacks jurisdiction to hear. Furthermore, clause 3.5 of the Council's dispute resolution procedure allows the council to deal with unfair labour practice matters.

[27] It is therefore, my finding that Council has jurisdiction to hear the dispute as referred by the Applicants.

RULING

[28] The respondent's point in limine is dismissed.

BACKGROUND TO THE ISSUE

[29] The applicants are employed by the Respondent herein and are stationed at 10111 Unit and their positions are currently Constable, however at the start of this dispute they were in the positions of Administrative Clerks (AC) SR-5.

[30] The Performance Enhancement Process (PEP), which prescribes the implementation of this performance appraisal system, as the performance appraisal system to be used within the SAPS.

[31] Pay progression' means progression to a higher notch within the same salary level or scale, limited to the awarding of 3 notches per pay progression cycle for non-OSD employees and the number of notches provided for in the respective OSD for OSD employees.

[32] During the Performance Enhancement Process (PEP) cycle of 2017/2018 the applicants were assessed and qualified, however they were not pay progressed as required in terms of the respondent policy. Dissatisfied with this action the applicants lodged a grievance in terms of SSSBC Agreement 3 of 2005 (Applicant's Bundle Page 2 -13), however the grievance remained unresolved henceforth this matter was referred to the SSSBC for adjudication.

[33] Conciliation failed and the certificate of non-resolution of the dispute was issued. The matter proceeded to arbitration. In terms of relief, the Applicants prayed that they be pay progressed in terms of the respondent's policy.

[34] The applicants alleged that the respondent acted unfairly by not pay progressing them.

THE APPLICANTS CASE

- [35] The applicants are employed by the Respondent herein and are stationed at 10111 Unit and their positions are currently Constable, however at the start of this dispute they were in the positions of Administrative Clerk (AC) SR-5.
- [36] A broad statutory framework within which performance management and performance appraisal is mandated is described by: - Chapter 10, Section 195(1)(h) of the Constitution Act 108 of 1996, which states that good human-resource management and career-development practices, to maximise human potential, must be cultivated. Although not explicitly stated this section implies a shift to performance management.
- [37] The Performance Enhancement Process (PEP), which prescribes the implementation of this performance appraisal system, is the performance appraisal system to be used within the SAPS.
- [38] PEP is fundamentally a development tool. One of the main aims of introducing PEP for Non-Commissioned Officers job levels 1 to 6 NCOs and 7 to 12 Commissioned Officers is to ensure that employees at these job levels are given the opportunity to develop their job skills and knowledge, so that they can perform better. The end result should be improved service delivery throughout SAPS (PEP User Guide 2002:2).
- [39] (PEP User Guide 2002:16) provides for the Evaluation and Assessment, this step involves a formal meeting between supervisor and supervised employee to evaluate and assess the supervised employee's performance, using the approved Performance Appraisal Instrument, the Performance Appraisal Instrument is a form carefully designed to ensure that it meets all the needs of the supervised employee and of SAPS, in the process of improving performance and service delivery. Performance Appraisal is the evaluation or assessment part of PEP. It involves the systematic and objective evaluation of a supervised employee's work by his or her supervisor.
- [40] 'Pay progression' means progression to a higher notch within the same salary level or scale, limited to the awarding of 3 notches per pay progression cycle for non-OSD employees and the number of notches provided for in the respective OSD for OSD employees.
- [41] During the Performance Enhancement Process (PEP) cycle of 2017/2018 the applicants were assessed and qualified, however they were not pay progressed as required in terms of the respondent policy. Dissatisfied with this action the applicants lodged a grievance in terms of SSSBC Agreement 3 of 2005 (Applicant's Bundle Page 2 -13), however the grievance remained unresolved henceforth this matter was referred to the SSSBC for adjudication.
- [42] The applicants did not receive the 1.5 % pay progression for the assessment cycle of 2017/2018. The Applicants avers that they were entitled to the pay progression as they performed satisfactorily

for the period in question. We further submit that the Respondent's failure to implement the pay progression is in contrast with paragraph 3; 4.3 and 5 thereof the instruction issued by Major General Acting Divisional Commissioner: Human Resource Utilisation dated 09/11/2018 (See Page 17-18 of Applicants bundle). The applicants further submit that all the applicants' assessment were conducted and were found to be met the requirements henceforth the score of 3 was entered, which means they performed between 50%-64% as result qualifying them to get a pay progression as required.

- [43] The matter concerns a dispute relating to Section 186 (2) (a) of the Labour Relations Act, as amended in terms of benefits. In the Labour Appeal Court decision of *Apollo Tyres (Pty) Ltd v Hoosen DA1/11 (2013) 34 ILJ 1120 (LAC)* at paras 25 to 26 the meaning of "benefit" in terms of the LRA came under scrutiny. The Court found that "benefit" in Section 186 (2) (a) of the Act means existing advantages or privileges to which an employee is entitled as a right and includes those granted in terms of a policy or practice which is subject to the employer's discretion.

Legal issues that arise from the above facts

- [44] The applicants stated that guidance should be drawn from the Labour Appeal Court in *HOSPERSA & Another v Northern Cape Provincial Administration (2000) 21 ILJ 1066 (LAC)* and *Gauteng Provinsiale Administrasie v Scheepers & Others [2000] 7 BLLR 756 (LAC)*, the court held that only disputes of right about already existing benefits can be heard by the CCMA. As a general rule, the term 'benefits' in the definition of unfair labour practice only includes benefits 'ex contractu and ex lege' – benefits that already exist in terms of a contract or law.
- [45] The applicants submitted that there's another guide issued by the Labour Court in *Protekon (Pty) Ltd v CCMA and others [2005] 7 BLLR 703 (LC)*, the court found that there are at least two instances in which an employer's conduct in relation to benefits may be subject to scrutiny: (i) Where the employer is bound by contractual obligations in this regard; and (ii) Where the employer enjoys discretion in terms of the contract to confer a benefit.
- [46] In *Apollo Tyres SA (Pty) Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and Others 4 (2013) 34 ILJ 1120 (LAC)* at para 47 the Court held: '... Therefore even where the employer enjoys a discretion in terms of a policy or practice relating to the provision of benefits such conduct will be subject to scrutiny, by the CCMA, in terms of s 186(2)(a).' A similar approach was followed in *Aucamp v SA Revenue Service 5 (2014) 35 ILJ 1217 (LC)* at para 29 where it was said: 'Even if a benefit is subject to conditions and the exercise of a discretion, an employee could still, as part of the unfair labour practice proceedings, seek to have instances where the employee then did not receive such benefit adjudicated. So therefore, even if the benefit is not a guaranteed contractual right per se, the employee could still claim same on the basis of an unfair labour practice if the

employee could show that the employee was unfairly deprived of same. An example would be where an employer must exercise a discretion to decide if such benefit accrues to an employee and exercises such discretion unfairly.'

[47] The applicants pray to the arbitrator to ensure that the applicants right to a fair labour practice are protected accordingly and that they be granted what they pray for, that is to be paid their pay progression.

THE RESPONDENT'S CASE

BACKGROUND

[48] During the performance Enhancement Process (PEP) cycle of 2017/2018 the applicants were assessed and qualified, however were not pay progressed as required in terms of the respondent policy. The applicant lodged a grievance in terms of SSSBC Agreement No. 3 of 2005 which remained unresolved henceforth the matter was referred to the SSSBC for adjudication.

[49] The applicants did not receive the 1.5% pay progression for the assessment cycle of 2017/2018. The applicants aver that they are entitled to the pay progression as they performed satisfactory for the period in question. They further submitted that the respondent's failure to implement the pay progression is in contrast with paragraph 3; 4.3 and 5 thereof of the instruction issued by Major General Acting Divisional Commissioner: Human Resource Utilisation dated 09/11/2018 referred to in (page 17-18 of the applicants bundled.

[50] The respondent submitted that the applicants did not qualify for 2017/2018 pay progression as per the attached letter dated the 2018-11-30 with the name list of none qualifying employees, marked annexure ("C").

[51] The respondent prayed that the applicants claim be dismissed.

ANALYSIS OF EVIDENCE AND ARGUMENT

[52] Although I have considered all the evidence I will only refer in this award to those aspects relevant to determine the dispute, as I am required in terms of s 138(7) of the LRA to provide an award with brief reasons

- [53] In terms of Section 186(2) (a) of the LRA, benefits fall within the meaning of an “unfair labour practise”. section 186(2) provides that; (i) *“unfair labour practice” means an unfair act or omission that arises between an employer and employee involving – (ii) unfair conduct by the employer relating to the promotion, demotion, probation (excluding disputes about dismissals for a reason relating to probation) or training of an employee or relating to the provision of benefits to an employee*”. The onus is on the Applicant to prove, on a balance of probabilities, an unfair act or omission on the part of the Respondent that gives rise to an unfair labour practise.
- [54] The dispute was referred as an allegation of an unfair labour practice in relation to benefits. I am therefore required to determine whether the respondent's conduct was fair or unfair in disapproving the Applicant's leave application. It is my belief that to succeed in such a claim, the Applicant must show that the Respondent's conduct was arbitrary, capricious and therefore unfair.
- [55] It is common cause that during the Performance Enhancement Process (PEP) cycle of 2017/2018 the applicants were assessed.
- [56] Part VIII of the Public Service Regulation (2001) relates to performance and the assessment of performance. the Performance Enhancement Process (PEP), which prescribes the implementation of this performance appraisal system, as the performance appraisal system to be used within the SAPS. The respondent did not dispute or deny that the applicants were assessed and were found to have met the requirements hence the score of 3 was entered which meant they performed between 50% -64% as a result qualifying them to get a pay progression of 1.5% as required. Based on this undisputed evidence, it is my finding that the applicants are entitled to a pay progression of 1.5% pay progression for year circle of 2017/2018. The respondent conceded in its written submission that during the performance Enhancement Process (PEP) cycle of 2017/2018 the applicants were assessed and qualified, however were not pay progressed as required in terms of the respondent's policy.
- [57]) The respondent failed to confirm the actual percentage attained by applicants. Moreover, the respondent failed to substantiate and give reasons as to why the applicants were not entitled to receive the 1.5% pay progression. Based on the evidence submitted by the applicants, It is my finding that the applicants were entitled to 1.5 % pay progression.
- [58] In the absence of the reasons as to why pay progression was not paid to the applicants, it is my finding that the respondent exercised its discretion in relation to benefits that accrued to the applicants unfairly.’ The applicants succeeded to show that the respondent's conduct was arbitrary, capricious and therefore unfair.
- [59] The respondent acted unfairly by not paying the deserved benefits (pay progression for year 2017/2018) that are due to the applicants. That is, R226,652.76 per annum x 1.5 % = R3,399.78 X 2 . (2 stands for year cycle 2017/2018 and 2018/2019 .)

[60] In **Aries v CCMA & others (2006) 27 ILJ 2324 (LC)** the Court held that *"there are limited grounds on which an arbitrator, or a court, may interfere with a discretion which had been exercised by a party competent to exercise that discretion. The reason for this is clearly that the ambit of the decision-making powers inherent in the exercising of a discretion by a party, including the exercise of the discretion, or managerial prerogative, of an employer, ought not to be curtailed. It ought to be interfered with only to the extent that it can be demonstrated that the discretion was not properly exercised. The court held further that an employee can only succeed in having the exercise of a discretion of an employer interfered with if it is demonstrated that the discretion was exercised capriciously, or for insubstantial reasons, or based upon any wrong principle or in a biased manner"*.

[61] In view of the above judgement, and the reasons mentioned, I am inclined to interfere with the decision of the respondent, that is, not to pay the applicants the benefit that is due to them.

[62] In light of the above, I am convinced that the decision taken by the respondent was biased, unsubstantiated and unfair. It is further my finding that the Applicant succeeded to discharge the onus to prove that the respondent acted unfairly in not pay progressing them on a balance of probabilities.

[63] I therefore make the following award:

AWARD

[64] I order the respondent (**South African Police Services**) to pay progress the applicants (**see table on paragraph 68 for the list of affected applicants**) by 1.5% per annum for year cycle 2017/2018 at salary level 5 and ensure that the applicants are moved to the next salary notch.

[65] Each applicant on **paragraph 68 hereunder** must paid be paid **R6,799.58** which is the amount due for year circle 2017/2018 and year circle 2018/2019.

[66] The above amounts must be paid on or before 15 December 2020.

[67] As provided for by section 143(2) of the LRA, any unpaid amount due in terms of this award will attract interest at the rate prescribed in terms of section 2 of the Prescribed Rate of Interest Act, Act 55 of 1975, as from the date on which it was due.



_____: SSSBC Part-time Commissioner
Paul Phundu

[68] The applicants' details are as per the table below and attachment thereof namely the Persal print-out appears on Page 26 to 72 of Applicants Bundle of Documents.

No	Surname and Initials	Persal number	Final Mark/Score
1	Mkhuzangwe NW	20909039	3
2	Nkuna BN	71186841	3
3	Molekoa BE	71188002	3
4	Makgale N	71318496	3
5	Hlungwane NC	71795804	3
6	Baloyi UM	21315175	3
7	Nkwinika ND	72055936	3
8	Mashigo B	70946086	3
9	Mashinini KD	71188495	3
10	Ubombo L	71275461	3
11	Matlala MP	70477213	3
12	Matlala MG	71013245	3
13	Sekhalo MB	5444438	3

14	Kunene NE	20862784	3
15	Sigauke TD	21139512	3
16	Nakene MP	71184333	3
17	Mbele MB	71185615	3
18	Dipitso TM	71184287	3
19	Nthlabane RJ	71188452	3
20	Mokone JM	19035357	3
21	Boikanyo NC	5467438	3
22	Mjikelo MG	71285971	3
23	Dolo PH	71186387	3
24	Kau TC	22270663	3
25	Kgapola GG	71318691	3
26	Khumbane JL	17525462	3
27	Ledwaba W	71271457	3
28	Mashego AV	70802572	3
29	Mogopodi LS	71318801	3
30	Mugadi EC	17633737	3
31	Mutheiwana KR	71917799	3
32	Seakamela ML	70826064	3
33	Shawa ML	71188576	3
34	Sithole B	71186671	3

35	Talakgale ME	71271414	3
36	Thebeila ZM	71303014	3
37	Mvumvu AM	72056029	3
38	Madatshi HG	71912681	3
39	Kekana MG	71205969	3
40	Guzi N	70309752	3
41	Miya TF	71911502	3
42	Thuntsa SB	72184141	3
43	Bitterbos P	71207198	3
44	Mdoka PW	70000522	3
45	Moreosele MW	70023689	3
46	Mosiane RA	70023794	3
47	Mofokeng T	71189858	3
48	Longwe MN	71186786	3
49	Makgale N	71318496	3